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NOTE
THE SUPREME COURT AND OBSCENITY
The Supreme Court of the United States has now made binding law
of its oft-repeated dictum that obscenity is beyond the pale of constitutionally protected free expression. After being spared-or avoiding-the necessity of ruling squarely on the constitutional status of
obscene matter for 169 years, the Court addressed itself to virtually
every aspect of the whole slippery problem in a single year. The
Court disposed of seven obscene publication cases' in the twelve
months through January, 1958. These included three reversals this
term in memorandum decisions 2 merely citing the major opinion of the
series, which was handed down in the combined cases of Roth v. United
States and Alberts v. California.3 The net result appears to be that
the controlling constitutional issue in obscenity cases hereafter will
be the proper application of the definition of obscenity laid down by
the five-man majority in Roth:
Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing
to prurient interest. 4
The proper application will be difficult, as two appellate courts
discovered after they endeavored to follow the Roth precedent to
uphold findings of obscenity and were reversed in memorandum decisions by the Supreme Court.5
BACKGROUND

The Common Law of Obscenity
The publication of obscene prints and books was a misdemeanor indictable at common law in England before and at the time of the
American Revolution. 6 The indication is strong that this was accepted
1. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 78 Sup. Ct. 365 (1958); One, Inc.

v. Oleson, 78 Sup. Ct. 364 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 267
(1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (two cases); Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).

2. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, supra note 1; One, Inc. v. Oleson,
supra note 1; Mounce v. United States, supra note 1. See 26 U.S.L. WEEK
1107 (1958).

3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
4. Id. at 487.
5. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd
per curiam, 78 Sup. Ct. 365 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 247 F.2d 148 (9th
Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 78 Sup. Ct. 267 (1957). For a history of obscenity
law from earliest times, see ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956).

6. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770)

(Essay on
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as the law in America at the time of the adoption of the first amendment,7 but it presented few problems for the courts so far as the
early reported cases show. 8 The scattered reports available were
concerned with common-law questions, and no issues appear to have
been raised either on the definition or the constitutional status of
obscenity. This remained true until after the Civil War, although obscenity cases began to appear with increasing frequency after the
beginning of the Victorian era.9
FederalStatutes
Obscenity cases seem to have made their first appearance in the
federal courts after Congress inserted a ban on importation of indecent
matter in the Customs Act of 1842.10 The federal judges seemed to
be as unaware as the state courts of any difficulty about the definition or the constitutional status of obscenity, 1 and these issues remained dormant for another thirty years.
The landmark case upholding the power of the federal government
to censor the mail under the postal clause' 2 of the Constitution arose
more than ten years after the Civil War under an 1872 statute.13 This
case, Ex Parte Jackson,14 concerned censorship of lottery advertising,
but it included the first in a long line of dicta tending to establish
that obscenity enjoyed none of the constitutional protection accorded
to free expression. 5 The theory of the case was that Congress was
not required to provide mail service, and therefore no deprivation of
constitutional rights could result if the privilege of using the service
Woman); Rex. v. Curl, 2 Str. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727) (Venus in the
Cloister, or The Nun in Her Smock); 29 CYc. 1318 (1908).
7. "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821) (Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S.&R. 91 (Pa. 1815) ("a lewd and

obscene painting representing a man in an obscene, impudent and indecent

posture with a woman.")
9. Commonwealth v. Tarbox, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 66 (1848); People v.
Girardin, 1 Mich. 90 (1848); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1857); Bell v.
State, 31 Tenn. 42 (1851); State v. Hanson, 23 Tex. 233 (1859); State v.
Brown, 27 Vt. 619 (1855). An argument that the Constitution invalidated the
common law on blasphemy was rejected in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
10. 5 STAT. 1848, c. 270 § 28 (1842), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1952). The federal
courts had not been concerned with state cases on obscenity under the view
that the first amendment inhibited only Congress. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 242 (1833).

11. Anonymous, 1 Fed. Cas. 1024, No. 470 (D.N.Y. 1865); United States v.
One Case Stereoscopic Slides, 27 Fed. Cas. 255, No. 15,927 (D. Mass. 1859);
United States v. Three Cases of Toys, 28 Fed. Cas. 112, No. 16,499 (S.D.N.Y.
1843).
12. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [T]o Establish Post Offices and
post Roads." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
13. 17 STAT. 302 (1872), 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952).
14. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
15. Id. at 737.

19581

NOTE

is withheld. Another dictum clarifying this theory has proved less
durable than the one concerning obscenity. This dictum was that if
"printed matter be excluded from the mails, its transportation in any
other way cannot be forbidden by Congress."'1 6 Nevertheless, within
twenty years Congress forbade the interstate transportation of obscene
matter by common carrier,17 and this statute has stood on the books
alongside the obscene mail statute for sixty years without a Supreme
Court ruling on the applicability of the dictum. Still another statute
was added in 1955 extending the ban to any interstate transportation, 8
and this, too, has failed thus far to bring a decision on the point from
the Court.
The Definition Problem

Meanwhile, the problem of defining obscenity grew in importance.
The words "obscene" and "obscenity" are usually defined in terms
of other words equally as difficult to define, all ultimately involving
a subjective judgment. Thus obscene has been defined as offensive
to taste; foul; loathsome; disgusting; offensive to chastity of mind or
to modesty; expressing or presenting to the mind or view something
that delicacy, purity, and decency forbid to be exposed; lewd; indecent; ... inauspicious and ill-omened,'9 A legal definition of long
standing is "such indecency as is calculated to promote the violation
of the law and the general corruption of morals."20
Regardless of how the words may be defined, courts must invoke
somebody's sense of moral values to determine the legal consequences
of the definition. Whose sense of decency, or good taste, or delicacy is
controlling? Whose morals must the matter tend to corrupt-the most
easily corruptible members of society? Those most incorruptible? 21
One of the most influential tests evolved was the so-called Hicklin
rule: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
'22
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.

This English rule was adopted by many American courts, including
16. Id. at 733.
17. 29 STAT. 512 (1897), 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1952).
18. 69 STAT. 183 (1955), 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. IV 1957).
19. MERMIAM-WEBSTER NEW

INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY 1681 (2d ed. 1955).

For exhaustive discussions of various approaches to the definition of obscenity see Abse, Psychodynamic Aspects of the Problem of Definition of Obscenity, 20 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROB. 572 (1955); Gardiner, Moral Principles
Towards a Definition of the Obscene, id. at 560; Kaplan, Obscenity as an
Esthetic Category, id. at 544; La Barre, Obscenity: An Anthropological Appraisal,id. at 533. See also ST. JOEN-STEVAS, OBSCENrY AND THE LAW (1956).
20. 29 Cyc. 1315 (1908).
21. See Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAW & CONTENMP.
PROB. 587 (1955); Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and
the Constitution,38 IVInm. L. REV. 295 (1954).
22. The Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
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the federal courts, 23 despite judicial complaints that it allowed judg-

ment of a book by isolated passages in relation to their effect on the
most susceptible class of readers. 24 The test has been rejected with
increasing frequency in recent years in favor of tests based on the
work as a whole as it affects an average member of the community. 25

Freedom of Expression Since World War I
The obscenity problem was only one aspect of the overall conflict
between free expression and the growing power of government. A
new ferment of judicial thought on the meaning of the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press was created by the cases
arising out of the security measures of World War J.26 These cases
developed three tests by which a line might be drawn between permitted and forbidden speech when it was alleged to threaten the national security. The "direct incitement" test was proposed by Learned
Hand, then a district judge, in 1917:27
To counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either that
it is his interest or his duty to do it.... If one stops short of urging upon
others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to
me that one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation.
This was reversed on appeal and the "natural consequences" test laid
down to replace it: 28
If the natural and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law, and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade
to resistance, it is immaterial that the duty to resist is not mentioned, or
the interest of the persons addressed in resistance is not suggested.
Two years later, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court, announced the "clear and present danger" test: 2
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
23. E.g., Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); McFadden v. United
States, 165 Fed. 51 (3d Cir. 1908), writ of error denied, 213 U.S. 288 (1909),
cert. denied, 214 U.S. 511 (1909); State v. Clein, 93 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1957);
Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930); People v. Pesky,
230 App. Div. 200, 243 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 373,

173 N.E. 227 (1930), reargument denied, 255 N.Y. 576, 175 N.E. 320 (1930).
24. E.g., United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).

25. E.g., Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
938 (1949); United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
26. Writers, too, contributed to the controversy. See, e.g., Carroll, Freedom
of Speech and of the Press in War Time: The Espionage Act, 17 McH. L. Rsv.
621 (1919); Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HAiv. L. REv. 932
(1919); Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment: A
Rdsume, 30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920).
27. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
See, Lancaster, Judge Hand's Views on the Free Speech Problem, 10 VAND. L.
REv. 301 (1957).
28. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 38 (2d Cir. 1917).
29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent.
This last test has been hailed as a milestone in the history of free
expression but it has had a somewhat uneven career in the courts
30
from the start. Its present status is in question.
The modern law of freedom of expression, however, may really be
3
said to date from Gitlow v. New York, ' decided in 1925, when the
Court made the historic "assumption" that the fourteenth amendment
applied to the state governments the prohibitions which the first
amendment decreed against Congress. 32 Thus not only was the scope
of the Court's review of cases in the area of free expression greatly
broadened, but the impact of its decisions was tremendously increased.
Although Gitlow's conviction was upheld, the principle was soon
affirmed in cases striking down state convictions under criminal syn33
dicalism laws.
In 1931 this new principle allowed the court, in Near v. Minnesota,3
to breathe constitutional life into Blackstone's principle that a free
man's right to speak his mind was immune from previous restraints,
although exercise of the right might subject him to later punishment.
On this principle the decision struck down a Minnesota injunction
statute. The Court found hard questions presented in this area by
38
and has
the handbill,36 sound truck37 and public -assembly cases,
so far managed to leave open the question of whether prior censorship
30. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957); United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aft'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Antieau, Dennis
v. United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion? 5 VANrD. L. REV. 141
(1952); Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and PresentDanger," 27 NOTRE DAME LAW.
325 (1952); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-from Schenck to Dennis, 52
CoLum. L. REV. 313 (1952). For controversy on the merits, see Meiklejohn, The First Amendment and Evils that Congress Has a Right to Prevent,
26 IND. L.J. 477 (1951); Mendelson, The Clear and Present Danger Test-A
Reply to Mr. Meiklejohn, 5 VAN. L. REV. 792 (1952).
31. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
32. Id. at 666. Mr. Justice Harlan (the elder) proposed the principle in
his dissent in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), but Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the majority, said that even if accepted, the principle
would not have given the court jurisdiction in that case.
33. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). The full force of the
first amendment has now been virtually written into the fourteenth. Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). But see dissenting opinions of
Harlan, J., in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957); Jackson, J., in
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287 (1952); and Holmes, J., in Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).
34. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
35. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151.
36. E.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), judgment vacated, 319 U.S.
103 (1943).
37. E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948). See 2 VAN.L. REv. 113 (1948).
38. E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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of movies is in itself an unconstitutional exercise of state power.3 9
It has made it abundantly clear in these cases, however, that prior
licensing of any kind will be closely scrutinized, and must be administered under clearly and narrowly drawn statutes which leave censors
little room for arbitrary action. 40
It is difficult to assess the net effect of the Court's decisions since
it undertook the role of final arbiter in both state and federal freedom
of expression cases. Two important generalizations may be drawn,
however, from what the cases had shown of the Court's attitude by
the time it turned its attention to the full implications of the obscenity
problem: (1) The Court assigned a high priority to freedom of expression under its concept of "balancing of interests"; 41 (2) It was
willing to commit itself to a great deal of case-by-case drudgery rather
than establish boundaries too sharply. 42

THE NEW LAw OF OBSCENITY
Virtually every proposition of constitutional law which had any
possible application to the facts involved was presented to the court
by one or another of the numerous parties and amici curiae in the four
obscenity cases heard in the 1956-57 term.43 The Court, sharply split
on three of the cases, gave direct consideration to most of the contentions in the three majority opinions.
The primary principles laid down were these:
1. Obscenity is not included in the area of constitutionally protected
free expression. 44
2. The test of obscenity is "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.145
3. A state may enjoin sale of an obscene book, under a properly
drawn statute, without exercising an unconstitutional prior restraint
or violating the right of trial by jury.46
39. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
40. Ibid.; Holmby Productions v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870

(1955); Superior
Films v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S.
960 (1952). See 5 VA-D.L. REV. 819 (1952).
41. See notes 36-40, supra.
42. "Every power may be abused, but the possibility of abuse is a poor
reason for denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal
libels sanctioned by centuries of Anglo-American law. 'While this Court
sits' it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which encroaches on
freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel. Of course discussion
cannot be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not
be stifled." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1952). See also 6 VAND.
L. REV. 393 (1953).
43. See Briefs of Counsel filed in Butler, Kingsley, and Roth cases, abstracted
at 1 L. Ed. 2d 1889, 2192, 2198.
44. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
45. Id. at 489.
46. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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4. A state may not limit its adult readers to literature fit for chil47
dren.
ConstitutionalStatus
In the combined Roth and Alberts cases, the Court addressed itself
to almost all of the principal issues involved in criminal convictions
under both federal and state laws. It upheld both convictions-by a
vote of seven to two in the California case and six to three in the
federal case. The sweeping holding that obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press, however, was supported only in the opinion of a five-man majority. These five, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brennan, reached this holding, first, by relying on
the Court's own consistent assumptions in a long line of previous
cases; 48 second, by showing that all state governments involved in
adopting the Bill of Rights considered obscenity a proper subject of
legislation both before and after the adoption; 49 and, third, by asserting
the view that first amendment history implied a rejection of obscenity
as "utterly without redeeming social importance." 50
The holding that obscenity is unprotected was given great force in
the majority opinion as the basis for summarily disposing of appellants' arguments based on the "clear and present danger" test, on the
ninth and tenth amendments and on the asserted differences in scope
of the first and fourteenth amendments.
Definition
The holding that obscenity was beyond the constitutional pale apparently could have settled both cases since there was no contention
that the publications involved were not obscene. However, this holding
served only to narrow the real constitutional question to the problem
of defining a single elusive word. Therefore the majority took up this
problem at some length, with somewhat confusing results.
The first brief statement of the definition was footnoted with a more
47. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
48. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); United States v. Lime-

house, 285 U.S. 424 (1932); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Bartell
v. United States, 227 U.S. 427 (1913); Public Clearing House v. Coyne; 194
U.S. 497, 508 (1904); Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897); Price
v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281
(1897); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896); Swearingen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896);
Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S.
255, 261 (1890); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 737 (1877).
49. 354 U.S. at 482.
50. Id. at 484. The court also said, "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-urlorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interests." Ibid.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 11

extensive-discgssig
-which equated "appealing to prurient interest"
with "a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." This, in turn, was identified with the general definition developed in the case law, and this
with the definition in the American Law Institute's Model -Penal Code,
Tentative Draft No. 6. Yet, as the dissenting justices pointed out,5'
the drafters of the Code had explained that their selection of the words
&(prurientinterest" was a rejection of "the prevailing tests of tendency
to arouse lustful thoughts or desires. . . ." The majority finally expressed the definition in the form of a legal test in these words:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest.52
Further complicating the job of determining the precise meaning
of the majority's definition was its holding that the trial courts in the
two cases used the proper definition. Mr. Justice Douglas indicated
that there were three different definitions, all of them bad because
they did not require "any nexus between the literature which is
prohibited and action which the legislature can regulate or prohibit. 53
"The Court," said Mr. Justice Harlan, "merely assimilates the various tests into one indiscriminate potpourri."5 4
PriorRestraint and Trial by Jury
In Kingsley Books v. Brown, 5 decided the same day as Roth, the
Court split differently, deciding five to four, with no concurring opinions, that a New York statute 56 providing injunctive procedures for
dealing with obscene matter was valid. The statute provided that a
municipal officer could sue for an injunction against sale of obscene
matter, that the defendant had a right to trial within a day of joinder
of issue and to a decision in two days after the end of the trial, that
after a final order against the defendant the obscene matter could
be seized and destroyed, and that the defendant would be chargeable
51. Id. at 499, 513.
52. Id. at 489. This test is presented, not as the court's own test, but as an
approved statement of the test already substituted for the Hicklin rule by
many lower courts. This assertion is footnoted with citations to cases, including United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930), in which the
Hicklin rule was accepted, the court of appeals finding the material not
obscene even by that test.
53. 354 U.S. at 513. Douglas said that under the Roth test, "the material
'must be calculated to corrupt and debauch the minds and morals' of 'the
average person in the community,'" and in Alberts it must have "'a substantial
tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or
arousing lustful desire.'" Id. at 508, 509. The Roth jury also was charged,
"You may ask yourselves does it offend the common conscience of the community by present-day standards." Ibid.
54. Id. at 500.
55. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
56. N.Y. CODE CIMv. PROC. § 22-a.

NOTE
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with knowledge of the contents of the matter in question from the
day of the first summons. Although the statute by its terms appears
to provide only for an injunction upon final judgment, an injunction
pendente lite was issued with the defendant's consent. The appeal
challenged only the statute, but the Court refers to the injunction
pendente lite as part of the statutory scheme and said that this device
was merely "a safeguard against frustration of the public interest in
effectuating judicial condemnation of obscene matter. '57 The Court
took no notice of the Chief Justice's assertion in his dissenting opinion
that in this case police already had seized the books under another
statute before the court order was obtained. 8 The majority's holding
on the statute was that "as authoritatively construed, it studiously
withholds restraint upon matters not already published and not yet
found to be offensive. '5 9 Although the opinion is not entirely clear
on the point, it seems to leave open the possibility that the issues raised
in dissent concerning the injunction pendente lite and the police
seizure might be attacked in a future proceeding less narrowly confined to the validity of the statute.
The jury trial issue was considered briefly, apparently in answer to
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent. The appellant does not appear to have
raised the issue. The Court observed that the consequences of a
judicial condemnation under the statute in question were no more
restrictive of freedom of expression than a misdemeanor conviction
would be. The Constitution, the Court said, does not require jury trials
60
in state misdemeanor cases.
Children'sObscenity Standard
Of the four cases decided in the 1956-57 term, only Butter v. Michigan6' rescued the defendant from the censorial power of the state,
and it was the only unanimous decision. The case struck down a
Michigan statute which prohibited sale to the general public of obscene material "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or
immoral acts."62 The sale which was the basis of prosecution was to a
policeman. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
disposed of it thus:
We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the
adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.
It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual,
now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
57.
58.
59.
60.

354 U.S. at 440.
Id. at 445.
Ibid.
Id. at 443.

61. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
62. MmHc. STAT. ANN. § 28.575 (1954).
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.We are constrained to reverse this conviction.6 3
Beginnings of Refinement
The first case to be summarily reversed on the authority of Roth was
originally heard in 1955 by the District Court for the District of Colum64
bia under the title United States v. 4200 Copies Int'l Journal.
The
district court approved destruction of a large quantity of imported
nudist magazines under the obscene import statute, 5 after holding
them obscene in relation to the standard of the "average, normal, reasonable, prudent person of the community." The test was worded
this way:
If, at the time of circulation, considered as a whole it offends the sense
of propriety, morality, and decency of such average person, it is within
the bar of the statute. 66
The court of appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion which
cited the Roth case. 67 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed,
and remanded to the district court for consideration in the light of
Roth.6a
In January of this year two more cases were summarily reversed.
In Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield,69 the trial court quoted a potpourri of passages from various cases, one of which was worded in
terms of the Hicklin rule, calling them "the beacons by which the
channel is lighted." It judged the nudist magazine in question "obscene
and indecent when judged by the ordinary standards of the vast
majority of the citizens of our country." The court of appeals affirmed,
five to three, citing Roth. Three dissenting judges asserted that the
decision exceeded the prior restraint limits set in the Kingsley case
and failed to satisfy those portions of the Roth test requiring that the
70
"dominant theme" be ascertained from the book "taken as a whole.)
In One, Inc. v. Oleson,71 the Ninth Circuit described particular articles
in a magazine on the "dangers of homosexuality" as "cheap pornography" and added that "the articles mentioned are sufficient to label
the magazine as a whole obscene and filthy." It also quoted words
similar to those of the Hicklin rule with apparent favor. The Supreme
2
Court reversed both, citing Roth
A common factor in two of the cases is the mention of the Hicklin
63. 342 U.S. at 383.
64. 134 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1955).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

46 STAT. 688 (1930), as amended 19 U.S.C. 1305 (1952).
134 F. Supp. at 493.
Mounce v. United States, 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957).
Mounce v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 267 (1957).
128 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1955).
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
241 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 1957).

72. 78 Sup. Ct. at 364, 365.
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rule, which was rejected in Roth, but it is difficult to tell what shades
of wording in the lower court opinions might be found to be in fatal
conflict with Roth, especially in view of the lower court definitions
approved in that case. Thus the process of refining definitions may be
slow if the court relies on memorandum reversals.
The Dissenters
The three reversals this year turned the numerical score against the
censors in the seven cases here considered. Although they won in
Roth, Alberts and Kingsley, they were set back by the whole court in
Butler, Sunshine Books, Mounce and One, Inc. Furthermore, the
judges who voted against the defendants in all three of the cases
which upheld censorship are less than a majority. In Kingsley the
bare five-man majority did not include all of the five who went along
with the majority opinion in the Roth-Alberts decision. Furthermore,
the Kingsley majority included Mr. Justice Harlan, who concurred only
in the Alberts result and dissented in the Roth result. Thus the major
principles announced in the Roth case did not have sufficient strength
for specific application in the Kingsley case where issues of prior
restraint and trial by jury were added. Only the Alberts case could
be cited in the Kingsley opinion, and that only for its result.
Thus a careful reading of the dissenting and concurring opinions is
necessary to any assessment of what the Court has done in the
obscenity field. Here is a brief summary of the positions taken by the
five dissenting justices:
Douglas and Black. With Douglas writing most of the opinions, these
two have formed the hard core of resistance to any invasions of freedom of expression through the years. In Roth,73 Douglas wrote a convincing argument showing the futility of obscenity laws and the
desirability of a constitutional policy based on "confidence in the
ability of our people to reject noxious literature." Whether he is as
convincing in arguing that such a policy has already been constitutionally adopted is another question. In Kingsley, with Black again
joining him, he denounces the New York injunction procedure as
"prior restraint and censorship at its worst."74
Harlan. Rejecting the contention that the first amendment prohibitions apply to the state governments through the fourteenth amendment with the same force that it applies to Congress by its terms,
Mr. Justice Harlan would have preferred to take the Post Office
Department out of the censorship business while leaving the states
leeway to prohibit obscene matter. He contends, in concurring in
73. 354 U.S. at 508.
74. Id. at 446.
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the AlbertS7 5 result, that the Court's function is narrow in reviewing
state policy and that the very division of expert opinion on the effects
of obscene literature on society counsels respect for the state's choice
of methods of dealing with the evil. In his Roth dissent, he contends
that the interests obscenity statutes purportedly protect are primarily
entrusted to the states and that Congress has no substantive power
over sexual morality. He joined the majority in Kingsley, again
supporting state action.
Warren. The Chief Justice proposed an interesting shift of emphasis in his concurring opinion in Roth-Alberts. He suggested that
-it be remembered that the -conduct of a person is the central issue and
the obscenity of the publication is merely a relevant attribute of that
conduct. He would have rested affirmance on the finding that the
defendants were "plainly engaged in the commercial exploitation of
the morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect,"7

which is constitutionally punishable conduct. In Kingsley he strongly
condemned the New York procedure as prior restraint.
Brennan. The author of the majority opinion in Roth dissented in
Kingsey77 on the ground that the New York law deprived the defendant of the constitutional right of jury trial. The definition of obscenity
laid down in Roth, he said, was one which should be applied to the
facts by a jury.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Justice Harlan, with admirable restraint and colorfully mixed
metaphor, suggested in his separate opinion in Roth that the majority
"paints with such a broad brush that I fear it may result in a loosening
of the tight reins which state and federal courts should hold upon
enforcement of obscenity statutes. 7 8s A single passage of dictum from
the majority opinion will illustrate:
The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left
ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack
necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.7 9

The conflicting metaphor may be amusing, but the unnecessary use
of phrases like "more important interests" is not. Used in this broad
context in opposition to the general concept of free expression, as
differentiated from the specific context of the case at hand, this may
well be interpreted by censorial minds as justification for activities
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

496.
496.
447.
496.
488.
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which the Court very likely would disapprove, but which are not
likely to come before it for review. 80
The language used in the actual holdings falls short of solving the
problem at hand, which is to set understandable limits on governmental interference with individual freedom in this area without
depriving it of power to protect legitimate community and individual
interests in combating evils associated with commercialized pornography. The Court swept aside balancing formulas and standards set
up in the past for solving similar .problems, and, in effect, reduced the
whole argument to the definition of the single word "obscenity." Yet
the definition laid down, taken in the context of the opinion, is as
subjective as the word itself in some respects, and a great deal of
case-by-case litigation may be necessary to give it understandable
meaning.
Fortunately, the net effect of the entire group of cases appears to be
much more restrictive of censorship than the language of the prevailing opinions would indicate, and a good deal of constructive thinking
was displayed in the separate opinions. The Chief Justice suggested a
shift in emphasis in the cases from the obscene matter itself to the
conduct of the defendants. This merits further judicial and legislative
exploration. It might be that the emphasis could be shifted even further to focus on the damage done in terms of the rights of other individuals which may have been invaded against their will. 81 Mr.
Justice Harlan's proposal would retire the federal censors permanently, leave the obscenity problem to the several states and limit
the federal courts' role to a narrow compass. This, too, merits study
since it offers forty-eight opportunities for free men to battle the
censors for possible victory or acceptable compromise, without the
weight of federal authority and precedent to be argued against them.
Perhaps a few might become havens for individualism by adopting,
under constitutional procedure, the views of Mr. Justice Douglas.
There seems to be little doubt that the opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas on the obscenity question are at variance with the intent of those
who drafted and adopted the amendments under which he would impose them on state and federal governments alike. In addition, he is
apparently at odds with the consistent interpretation placed on those
amendments by the courts and the public. The weakness of his
80. For a convincing argument that the post office censors operate in defiance of court rulings and give in when court action is threatened, see de
Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: a Study of Administrative Restraint, 20
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 608 (1955). For a study of censorship which is

ordinarily outside the scope of judicial review, see Twomey, The Citizens'

Committee and Comic-Book Control: a Study of Extragovernmental Restraint,
id. at 621.
81. For a vivid description of the plight of a defendant in an obscene publication case as compared with defendents in more serious cases, see introduction
by A. P. Herbert in ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW, at p. XIV.
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proposals as principles of federal constitutional law, however, detracts
nothing from the worth of his views on the substantive value of free
expression. Constitutional draftsmen, legislators, judges, and administrators of the future, both state and federal, might well heed the
article of faith he expressed in these words:
I have the same confidence in the ability of our people to reject noxious
literature as I have in their capacity to sort out the true from the false
in theology, economics, politics, or any other field. 82
PMILIP M. CARDEN

82. 354 U.S. at 514.

